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Armin von Bogdandy’s article entitled “German Legal Hegemony?” is an invitation
to reflect on the paths of European legal scholarship: what are the conditions of the
different national legal cultures today, and what are the conditions under which a
national legal culture can become hegemonic (or, on the contrary, is it possible for a
common tradition to prevail)?
A preliminary caveat must be made. There are many threads in this “cobweb”:
indeed, one must take into account the different national legal cultures and the
common European legal scene; the interactions among institutions; and the dialogue
between legal cultures, not to mention the actors involved (professors of law and
legal practitioners).
Just a few examples: At the EU level, the European Coal and Steel Community
(ECSC) was influenced to a great extent by the French Commissariat au Plan,
and the structure and functions of the European Atomic Energy Commission
(Euratom) were borrowed from the French Commissariat à l’Énergie Atomique. The
Treaty of Brussels of 1975 establishing the European Court of Auditors follows the
German Bundesrechnungshof, which has strictly administrative tasks (and not also
judicial ones, unlike its French and Italian counterparts). However, in some ways,
the European Court of Auditors also appears to have undergone the influence of
the French administrative system: for instance, the European Court of Auditors
advises the European Parliament on controlling the implementation of the budget.
From these examples, it is clear that international organizations borrow procedural
and management styles not from just one, but from many national cultures and
organizations.
Parallel to this institutional interchange, there are national legal cultures and the
growing koiné of European scholars, with their national, bilateral and multilateral
scientific societies, which act as “melting pots” for the formation of a common
understanding of the world of law. Here, too, it is possible to register important
cleavages: one example is the use of two different words to mean the same thing,
such as “scholarship” and “science”.
German scholarship has unquestionably played a leading role in some European
legal cultures – Italy, Spain, certain Eastern European countries, including Russia
– in the area of public law. At the root of this role, there are many elements. One is
the strength of German nationalism (think of Wagner and musical nationalism), as
compared to nationalist movements and ideas in other countries. Another element
is the ability of German legal scholarship (Savigny) to establish strong connections
with the glorious Roman law tradition, which “invented the law”. The third component
of the successful German hegemony is the extraordinary concentration of scholars
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in the newly designed “Humboldtian” German university. A final reason why German
legal scholarship became dominant were the conditions of the cultures it “colonized”,
whereby law had not freed itself from its social sciences roots and where, therefore,
the German influence helped draw a clear divide between politics, social and political
sciences, and law.
A “newcomer” nation like Italy saw, in German culture, a model to follow and
imitate; thence the Italian “Germanophilia” praised by the leading Italian philosopher
Benedetto Croce. However, this Germanophilia was limited to German culture,
German lawyers’ approach to the law, and their methods. It did not extend to the
prevailing legal institutions of Wilhelmine Germany.
On the other hand, the reach of this hegemony was limited to some European
countries only; it did not involve nations such as France and the United Kingdom, for
example.
Can Germany revive its nineteenth-century heyday? As I wrote in 20091)L’Unione
europea e il guinzaglio tedesco, in “Giornale di diritto amministrativo”, 2009, n. 9, p.
1003, on the judgment of the German Constitutional Court 2BvE 2/08 and expanded
on in 20202)Il guinzaglio tedesco, in “Il Foglio”, on the judgment 2BvR 859/15,
1651/15, 2006/15, 980/16 on the Public Sector Purchase Programme, also known
as “Quantitative Easing”., the Second Senate of the German Constitutional Court
is attempting to put the development of the Union “on a leash”, by establishing the
principle that the Union is not an institution that “runs of itself” (an expression used in
1888 for the American Constitution); contrary to what is implicit, instead, in Article 1
of the Treaty on European Union (TEU), which states that the EU is an “ever closer
Union”. According to the German Constitutional Court, the States are “die Herren
der Verträge”. On this reading, Article 5 TEU prevails over Article 1 of the same
Treaty. There are no “implied powers”. Every competence of the Union needs a
specific national and/or popular delegation; the Union does not have full democratic
legitimacy; it cannot be the engine of its own development; and it is not a process in
motion.
Can this be repeated in the area of legal scholarship?
The idea to establish a German legal hegemony may be considered a by-product
of Germany’s leading economic position, since the Union originated as, and is still,
predominantly an economic community. Undoubtedly, Germany is a dominant force
in the Union, due to its size, its economic development, the stability and continuity
of its governments, its tradition of “Juristenmonopol”, the resources invested in
the area of law, and the role it plays in the offices and in the corridors of Palais
Berlaymont. Despite their short history as a united nation  and their turbulent history,
“the Germans do it better” (as noted by the English author John Kampfner, in Why
the Germans do it better. Notes from a grown-up country, London, Atlantic Books,
2020).
However, many factors pull in a different direction. The first is language: English
is used to communicate among scholars and practitioners. The second is the
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“communis opinio”, currently becoming established in the world and among
European nations, that at the centre of the study and the teaching of law lie legal
concepts such as constitutionalism, the rule of law, and judicial review, developed
predominantly in the Anglo-Saxon world. The third is the increasingly important role
played by research on common traditions, which requires finding the commonalities
among the European legal systems, instead of what is peculiar to each of them,
and thus compels a shift from legal comparison to comparative law (a methodology
followed by the Venice Commission for Democracy through Law: for example,
in its “Report on the Rule of Law”, of 4 April 2011, it started with defining the
different traditions and trying to find a “consensual definition”; in its “Report on the
Independence of the Judicial System”, 16 March 2010, it started its enquiry from the
“existing standards”).
On the other hand, a number of typical traits of German scholarship hinder its
affirmation. One is its characteristic predilection for a dogmatic and system-oriented
approach in a world where this is becoming less popular. Another is hyperlegalism,
a stance that is not as flexible and eclectic as would be required in a communicating
world. A third trait is the limited role played by history in the study of German law
– a role that is, on the contrary, becoming important in other legal cultures (think
of the biographical research being conducted on leading figures such as Duguit
and Hauriou in France and Ascarelli in Italy). A fourth one is the weak interest of
young German law students in engaging with comparative law and supranational
law, as demonstrated by the experience of the European University Institute. In
the 44 years of the EUI’s existence, German law teachers have accounted for 25
percent of the total number of teachers and German students for 8 percent of the
total number of students. However, the number of German Ph.D. candidates in
law as a percentage of the total number of German candidates drops to just over 4
per cent (this statistic is for the last 16 years, the only ones for which digital data is
available at the moment).
In conclusion, I do not see a Germanized Europe, but rather a Europeanized
Germany (to repeat the famous sentence by Thomas Mann), despite the attempts by
the Second Senate of the German Constitutional Court to put Europe on a leash.
References
• 1. L’Unione europea e il guinzaglio tedesco, in “Giornale di diritto
amministrativo”, 2009, n. 9, p. 1003, on the judgment of the German
Constitutional Court 2BvE 2/08
• 2. Il guinzaglio tedesco, in “Il Foglio”, on the judgment 2BvR 859/15, 1651/15,
2006/15, 980/16 on the Public Sector Purchase Programme, also known as
“Quantitative Easing”.
- 3 -
